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Neo-Confucianism and industrial
relations in Meiji Japan
Stefania Lottanti von Mandach
Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies, University of Zurich, Zurich,
Switzerland
Abstract
Purpose – This paper sets out to explain the poor nature of industrial relations in Meiji Japan
(1868-1911), especially the puzzling lack of Neo-Confucianist values.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper combines two approaches. First, it draws on and
scrutinizes the major literature. Second, it uses a case approach.
Findings – First, we find that a widely accepted assumption used in many management (and other)
studies on Japan, namely, that Neo-Confucianismwas institutionalized in Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867),
is distorted. Second, we find that the poor nature of labor relations in Meiji Japan can be explained by
and is the product of a multitude of factors, both indigenous and imported from abroad.
Originality/value – First, this paper provides a novel explanation for the poor nature of labor
relations inMeiji Japan. Second, this paper corrects awidely held assumption on Japan that is frequently
used in management studies.
Keywords Japan, Neo-Confucianism, Labor Relations, Meiji era, Samurai, Management studies
Paper type General review
1. Introduction
Japan is famed for its industrial relations. One common explanation links its
harmonious nature to a centuries-old Neo-Confucianist heritage institutionalized in
Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867) with values such as loyalty, filial piety, reciprocal
obligation, harmony and duty (Bellah, 1985; Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Furuya and
Shiina, 1991; Hill, 1995; Fujimori and Ouchi, 1996) that influence Japanese economic
behavior in general and labor relations in particular (Long and Seo, 1977; Pascale and
Athos, 1981; Sours, 1982; Bellah, 1985; Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Subhash, 1990; Furuya
and Shiina, 1991; Whitehill, 1992; Hill, 1995; Fujimori and Ouchi, 1996; Boardman and
Kato, 2003; Blind, 2012)[1].
Against this background, the poor nature and the apparent lack of Neo-Confucianist
values in Meiji Japan (1868-1911) are puzzling. Contrary to what one might expect,
industrial relations were far from “warm master-servant relations” based on a
Neo-Confucianist tradition. Employers cared little for the well-being of their employees.
Employee morale was low, and absenteeism, sabotage, strikes and desertions were
frequent. Bureaucrats claimed that business leaders were only motivated by profits and
did not consider the well-being of their employees, leading to excessive rates of turnover
that were inimical not only to the interests of the enterprises but also to the economic
progress of Japan as a whole (Taira, 1962; Gordon, 1998). Overall, “there was then so
little of the feeling of loyalty between employer and worker which is said to be
characteristic of the employment relationships fifty years later” (Taira, 1962, p. 155).
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/1751-1348.htm
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How can these observations be explained? One conceivable thesis is that culture in
general and the Neo-Confucianist tradition in particular simply didn’t matter. In fact,
many economists have struggled to accept culture as a possible explanatory variable,
mainly due to the broad notion of culture and the difficulty to design testable hypotheses
(Guiso et al., 2006). However, recent attempts to overcome this impasse (for an overview
of recent papers, see Guiso et al., 2006; Gong et al., 2013), aswell as the vast contributions
by management theorist and sociologists on the effect of culture on economic and
political outcomes, leads to a rejection of this null hypothesis (DiMaggio, 1994; Dyck
et al., 2012; Preble and Hoffman, 2012).
Ornatowski (1996) hypothesizes that Neo-Confucianist values didn’t matter
temporarily. He argues that Neo-Confucianism somehow declined in Meiji Japan due to
its close relationship to the ideology of the Tokugawa regime and the strong
Westernizing tendencies of early Meiji era policies and thought and that it first had to
re-enter the workplace.
Morishima (1982), on the other hand,writesNeo-Confucianist values did, indeed, play
a role, but that only the samurai (warrior) elite, not the commoners (i.e. peasants, artisans
and traders) espoused Neo-Confucianist values. Because former samurai as well as
many merchants and rich peasants established new businesses in early Meiji Japan,
Neo-Confucianist values had not yet spread to all labor-management relations.
We propose a different explanation and argue that little of a Neo-Confucianist
heritage is detectable in Meiji labor relations because Neo-Confucianism wasn’t
institutionalized in Tokugawa Japan in the first place. While research suggests that
Neo-Confucianist values were institutionalized eventually post-Meiji Japan, a sound
analysis of their factual historical development is necessary prior to analyzing
Neo-Confucianist influences on present-day Japanese economic behavior and
institutions. As Smith and Smith (2011, p. 282) write in their article on the biased use of
the construct of the Protestant Work Ethic in management research, “Widely accepted
assumptions about key constructs unconsciously drive how scholars think and do
research. […] If a basic assumption is distorted, research utilizing this assumption is
suspect”. Thus, to scrutinize the historical development of Neo-Confucianism in
Tokugawa Japan and thereby a key assumption of much research about Japan, is one
objective of this paper. In addition, we contribute to the body of knowledge by taking a
fresh look at labor relations in Meiji Japan and providing a novel explanation for their
poor nature.
We proceed as follows. In a first step, we address the question of institutionalization
of Neo-Confucianist values in Tokugawa Japan. We base our claim that Neo-
Confucianist values were not institutionalized in Tokugawa Japan on two main
arguments, namely, on the analysis of the process and extent of institutionalization of
Neo-Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan, and on a case study that illustrates the
consistent lack Neo-Confucianist values in contemporary (economic) behavior even in
the case of the ruling samurai class. Aswewill show, the findings from these arguments
fit well with existing research on the nature of the Tokugawa rule, on the one hand, and
invented traditions in Japan, on the other hand, indicating that our case study does not
represent an exception to the rule. In a second step, we identify a coherent set of factors
explaining the poor nature of labor relations in Meiji Japan.
This article unfolds as follows. We start with a brief description of the political
structure and institutions (of which Neo-Confucianism was one) the Tokugawa rulers
JMH
20,4
388
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y U
ZH
 H
au
ptb
ibl
iot
he
k /
 Z
en
tra
lbi
bli
oth
ek
 Z
üri
ch
 A
t 0
5:5
5 2
0 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 (
PT
)
resorted to in order to achieve political stability in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we show that
the efforts by the Tokugawa rulers to anchor Neo-Confucianists values were severely
limited and sowas, as a consequence, the institutionalization of Neo-Confucianism, even
among the ruling samurai class. A case study in Chapter 4 illustrates our findings,
which we link to existing research on the nature of the bakufu-han (Tokugawa rulers
and their vassals) relationship and on the invented traditions[2] of modern Japan in
Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, then, we develop a coherent set of explanatory factors for the
poor labor relations, thereby explaining the questions raised in Chapters 4 and 5. In
Chapter 7, we summarize our main findings and highlight areas for further research.
2. Tokugawa Japan
The Tokugawa state was composed of a central directing force, the bakufu (or
shogunate) at the top and a number of local authorities that administered the land and
the people on behalf of the bakufu. The bakufu was located in Edo and headed by the
shogun. The shogun was the authority over national defense, foreign affairs and
legislation for the entire country. He controlled the minting of money, the
standardization of weights and measures and the regulation of trade. The bakufu also
controlled the cities of Edo, Kyoto, Nagasaki and Osaka. The rest of the country
(i.e. four-fifths of the land) was split into han (domains) that were strategically
distributed among approximately 250 daimyoˉ (vasalls). These domains were called
upon to cooperate in connection with building projects, but they were not taxed by the
bakufu. Economic policies were localized, i.e. domain-centered. Domains could use the
income generated through taxes within their domains for their own expenses. By and
large, the domains were nearly independent states with their own armies,
administrative and law codes, tax systems and tax codes (Jansen, 2000, p. 33).
During Tokugawa Japan, the bakufu constructed a number of formal institutions to
achieve political stability. For the bakufu, the daimyoˉwere the main threat because they
possessed territorial and military resources. Weakening and disrupting the daimyoˉ as a
groupwas themain preoccupation of the early Tokugawa rulers. To control the daimyoˉ,
a system known as sankin koˉtai (alternative attendance) was introduced. Nearly all
daimyoˉ had to alternate spending a year in Edo and a year in their domains while their
families remained permanently in Edo. There was great expense involved in
maintaining residences in both Edo and their domains, as well as in traveling to and
from Edo on a regular basis. This arrangement prevented the daimyoˉ from
accumulating too much financial power (Henshall, 1999, p. 52). As an additional
measure of stability, the Tokugawa rulers adopted a policy of national seclusion,
leading to the virtual closing of Japan for 150 years, and implemented a rigid
Neo-Confucianist social order known as shinoˉkoˉshoˉ (Yoshimura, 2003). Shinoˉkoˉshoˉwas
a four-tiered caste system – “warrior-peasant-artisan-merchant” – in descending order
of status. At the top was the warrior (samurai) class, a small educated ruling class that
performed all military and political functions and accounted for approximately six per
cent of the population (Henshall, 1999, p. 51). Peasants ranked second, higher than
artisans and merchants because, in Neo-Confucianist terms, they were regarded as the
essential producers. They nurtured the country and thereby provided income for the
samurai. The artisans, ranking third, changed the form of things and were, therefore,
useful. The merchants only moved things around and made them available for
389
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purchase. Accordingly, theywere the least important of the classes. Each individualwas
expected to assume the duties that were assigned by birth and occupation.
3. Neo-Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan
According to historiographical tradition, Neo-Confucianism was put to use by
Tokugawa Ieyasu as an ideological construct (Ooms, 1985, p. 297). It provided the
foundation and convenient justification for the system of strict social prescriptions, the
shinoˉkoˉshoˉ. Three mechanisms undergirded the authority structure of society. First,
Neo-Confucianism rested on the useful premise that there existed a natural division of
society by status and vocation. Second, it emphasized loyalty to superior authority and,
hence, rationalized submission to the authority of the daimyoˉ and various unit heads as
matters of principle. Third, Neo-Confucianism made rule by status acceptable. In
contrast to rule on the basis of personal dominance, the daimyoˉ exercised authority on a
generalized and impersonal basis under codified laws and regulations rather than on the
basis of personal or customary prerogative (Hall, 1974, p. 47). Therefore:
IeyasuTokugawa’s first taskwas to restore peace and purpose throughout the country. One of
the ways he did this was to adopt Confucianism as the official philosophy of his government.
Confucian philosophy provided Ieyasu with the justification for the organizational structure
he needed to rule Japan and the guidelines for proper behavior his citizens were to follow
(Boardman and Kato, 2003, p. 321).
As we will explain in the following, the problem with such account is twofold. First,
Neo-Confucianism did not serve as the state ideology from the beginning of Tokugawa
Japan (Ooms, 1985, p. 76; Bodart-Bailey, 1993, p. 294). Second, the bakufu did not have
adequate means and channels to promote Neo-Confucianism as the state ideology to all
classes later in the era. Hence, institutionalization was limited with regards to both time
and scope.
Early Tokugawa shoguns, never perceived Neo-Confucianism as a tradition that
deserved specific support. Tokugawa Ietsuna, the fourth shogun, even persecuted
certain Neo-Confucianist scholars (Bodart-Bailey, 1993, p. 294).
The position of theNeo-Confucianist scholars improved somewhat between 1690 and
1709 under the administration of the fifth Tokugawa shogun Tsunayoshi (1646-1709),
when the bakufu encouraged the practice of Neo-Confucianism (Bodart-Bailey, 1993,
p. 312). However, for Tsunayoshi, both Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism had
shortcomings and could not serve as philosophical systems alone; therefore, both
teachings were to be practiced in conjunction (Bodart-Bailey, 1993, p. 306).
Despite Tsunayoshi’s patronage of Neo-Confucianism, restrictions were imposed on
Neo-Confucianist scholars. Ooms (1984, p. 61) argues that as late as the Kansei Reforms
(1788-1793), Neo-Confucianist scholars (jusha) were no more than “applicants, selling
their ideologicalwares and longing for a bakufu patent”. The jusha took themselves very
seriously as the carriers of scholarly morality, but they were never part of the power
structure they served. Although Neo-Confucianist scholars served the shogun by
appointment, and advised and educated some of the upper reaches of warrior society
(Yoshioka, 1993), they collectively struggled with the frustration resulting from the fact
that the ideals of an earlier and imagined past, in which morality and action were
consistent, did not correspondwith the present society ofwhich theywere a part (Jansen,
2000). They attempted to prescribe remedies for social and political maladies, such as
the abolition of the institution of sankin koˉtai and the return of the samurai to their land
JMH
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because they regarded the sankin koˉtai as the root of all evil that had led to urbanization,
the spread of commercialism and merchant growth (Uematsu, 1995). None of this
happened, and the jusha were well aware that they were marginal to the decisions and
concerns of the ruling figures (Jansen, 2000, p. 195). Despite its initial disdain for
Neo-Confucianist scholars, later in the era, the bakufu sought its educational creed in
Neo-Confucianism to secure its regime (Song, 1970, p. 145). It lacked, however, themeans
to institutionalize Neo-Confucianist norms from top downwithin the Tokugawa society.
There was no national education system in place; therefore, there was no standardized
and enforced curriculum, and none was created during the Tokugawa era (Rubinger,
1986, p. 195).
There was some type of education system in place, but it was far from universal.
Education was unsystematic and was a patchwork of different teachers with various
experiences. It consisted of a loose configuration of discontinuous and primarily private
arrangements that were not under the control of a public authority (Rubinger, 1986,
pp. 195-201).
For the education of commoners, terakoya was the most important institution,
although it was not the only one (Tanaka, 1990). Shinto shrines and private institutions
shared the educational function. In the Tokugawa period, terakoya lost their religious
function and became entirely secular. This was a voluntary organization, unregulated
by the Government that taught children of both sexes. Teaching was vocationally
oriented and was concerned with the practical aspects of the commoner’s life, focusing
on reading, writing and calculation. The number of terakoya in the country was
approximately 15,500 before Meiji Restoration. They were found mainly in towns, and
the terakoya in villages were attended by the upper strata of the villages – if at all
(Kobayashi, 1965, p. 292; Song, 1970, p. 145; Dore, 1965, p. 252). The ordinary peasants
had neither the time nor the money for education (Kobayashi, 1965, pp. 292-293;
Henshall, 1999, p. 51). The merchants, in contrast, increasingly recognized that the
investment of time and money into education was economically worthwhile, and the
value of education was expounded in contemporary moral books for commoners
(Komiyama, 2006).
It was only towards the end of the 18th century that both the bakufu and the han
began to pay attention to the education of commoners. They established goˉgakuwith the
goal of countering political and economic unrest, which was growing among the
commoners (Jansen, 2000, p. 234). The goˉgaku curriculum emphasized a moral
indoctrination based on Neo-Confucianist values. It is estimated that approximately 130
goˉgaku existed throughout the country, a fairly small number compared to the number
of terakoya (Kobayashi, 1965, p. 293). Thus, the bulk of the commoners never enjoyed
any type of formal moral education on Neo-Confucianist ethics.
Samurai education occurred in three types of institutions: bakufu schools, han
schools and private schools. The primary purpose of bakufu and han schools was the
moral training of the hereditary elite (Rubinger, 1986, p. 197). The samurai were taught
subjects necessary for rulers; this distinguished the samurai from the commoners in
peacetime when distinction through military leadership was not possible. Thus,
Neo-Confucianist classics were important not only because of their content but also
because this knowledge was a status symbol (Kobayashi, 1965, p. 291). The classics
were taught not for intellectual pleasure but as training for dedicated service and duty to
the regional and ultimately political community (Jansen and Stone, 1967, pp. 210-211).
391
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The 21 bakufu schoolswere under the direct control of the bakufu and differed in their
educational functions. The highest institution of Neo-Confucianist learning was the
Hayashi Confucian Academy in Edo (Kobayashi, 1965, p. 290; Dore, 1965, p. 15ff). It was
founded by Hayashi Razan in 1630 and was subsequently run by the Hayashi family.
From 1798, it was managed under the auspices of the Tokugawa government, which
renamed it the Shoˉheizaka Academy (Shoˉheizaka Gakumonjo) (Sawa, 1999). The courses
taught at the school were Neo-Confucianist literature, history and composition. The
school served as the center of Neo-Confucianist doctrine and produced scholars and
learned officials of the Tokugawa government (Kobayashi, 1965, p. 290; Paramore,
2012).
Within each han, there were one or more han schools (hankoˉ, hangaku or hangakkoˉ).
In the early Tokugawa period, han schools emphasized Neo-Confucianist teaching. In
the 18th century, practical subjects, such as applied mathematics, military science,
medicine and astronomy, were included in the curricula of lower-ranking samurai.
Private schools (shijuku) for samurai, some of them independent and some supported by
local government, typically specialized in particular curricula, such as Neo-Confucianist
learning, Japanese studies or Western languages.
Whether the bakufu’s efforts to institutionalize Neo-Confucianist values among the
samurai elite also bore fruit, is a different question. When reading the writings of Ogyuˉ
Sorai (1666-1728), born a son of a samurai and one of the most influential
Neo-Confucianist scholars in Tokugawa Japan, the success of such efforts appears
limited. In his “Discourse onGovernment” (seidan), written in 1726-1727, Sorai discusses
the negative side effects of the economic growth and spread of commercialism that
occurred during Tokugawa Japan. He deplores the lack of Neo-Confucianist ethics in
contemporary economic behavior, the competitive mentality within society, the
bourgeois spirit of excessive consumption and the focus on “having” rather than “being”
that had infiltrated society because even the warrior class did not adhere to
Neo-Confucianist values (Lidin, 1999, p. 37).
A good case study to illustrate this issue is the disobedience and lack of loyalty
displayed by the daimyoˉ toward the bakufu with regard to the marketing of domain
goods (see next section)[3]. In Neo-Confucianist ideology, loyalty to one’s superior is not
only a sacred duty but is also an absolute obligation for religious salvation (Hill, 1995,
p. 123). The Japanese Neo-Confucianist thinkers of the Sorai school particulary stressed
that the basis of good government was individual feudal relations of loyalty (Paramore,
2012, p. 32). In theory, each daimyoˉ, i.e. (house) had a loyalty-dependence relationship
with the house of Tokugawa, which was at the apex of the vertical hierarchy. The bakufu’s
orders had to be followed and the daimyoˉ were expected to be loyal to the shogun in
every way. It was in the Tokugawa shogunate’s best interest to propagate such beliefs,
and, according to various accounts, it was successful in doing so (Bellah, 1985;
Maruyama, 1974).
4. The case of the marketing of domain goods
The daimyoˉ had sufficient autonomy in administering their holdings with regard to
economic and fiscal affairs as long as their policies did not conflict with those of the
bakufu (Nakamura andMiyamoto, 1982, p. 248).Before 1800, the aims of both the bakufu
and the daimyoˉ to tax as much of the production of their people as possible while
maintaining and possibly increasing the productive capacity of their territories did not
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conflict with one another. By the first quarter of the 18th century, although the
expansion of paddy acreage had given many daimyoˉ a larger tax base, nearly all
domains were spending more than they could collect in taxes, mainly due to the system
of sankin koˉtai and the occasional extraordinary levies demanded by the shogunate. To
increase their revenues, the domains actively encouraged the development of handicraft
industries and agricultural products that could be sold inside their domains and to the
national, bakufu-controlled market. They also established domain monopoly marketing
boards called senbai shihoˉ, a measure to place multiple types of specialty products
produced within their han under the governmental monopoly of their han (Takenaka,
1969, p. 150). With the establishment of domain monopoly marketing boards, all
commercial activities within the han apart from small-scale local peddling were
controlled by authorized castle town merchants, who were granted privileges in return
for their commercial and financial services.
By 1800, production had developed to such a point that marketing these products led
to a chronic conflict between the domains and the bakufu. The domain marketing
boards, which sold to both the local market and the national market, competed with the
distribution system that was controlled by the bakufu (Crawcour, 1989, p. 579). In
theory, the domains were not allowed to sell directly to bakufu-controlled urban
consumption centers. Trade between the han and the bakufu territories had to pass
through official channels in Osaka or Edo and was handled by authorized city
merchants. In practice, however, around 1820 the domains started to sell their products
outside of the official channels wherever they could secure the best price. Because the
bakufu bought the products at fixed prices, the domains attempted to avoid the Osaka
route and marketed products through other channels or directly to Edo. Consequently,
shipments to Osaka, the commercial center, fell by 30 per cent between 1820 and 1840.
Needless to say, this provoked strong resistance from the Osaka city merchants who
were struggling to maintain the privileges granted by the bakufu and who wanted to
prevent the domains from selling directly to urban consumption centers controlled by
the bakufu. The decreasing shipments to Osaka and the increasing profits of the
domains and rural merchants not only threatened the officially authorized city
merchants but also weakened the shogunate’s ability to control national commerce. In a
report prepared under the direction of Osaka City Magistrate, Abe Toˉtoˉmi no Kami, in
1841-1842, the domainswere blamed for diverting goods away fromOsaka because they
marketed their products elsewhere and prevented private shipments to Osaka. Only
when the domains found it convenient, the report said, did they market their goods in
Osaka, but then they used their monopoly power and threats of going elsewhere to
secure higher prices. The bakufu reacted and, attempting to reduce both its own
expenses and the profits of the domains, ordered a general 20-per cent price cut on goods
in Edo and Osaka, as well as a cut in wages and rents. It hoped that these reductions
would eventually lower the rates paid to the producers, thereby reducing the
attractiveness of industry and trade as opposed to agriculture. Prices, however, did not
fall as significantly as expected. Demand for consumer goods was no longer confined to
the large, bakufu-controlled consumption centers but had developed inmany other parts
of the country. Because sales could be made there, the domains and rural businessmen
were not prepared to cut their margins. Goods were simply diverted from
bakufu-controlled consumption centers to the country-side markets that had developed
(Crawcour, 1989, p. 596).
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5. An imagined past of Neo-Confucianist tradition
Thus, although in theory each daimyoˉ i.e. (house) had a loyalty-dependence relationship
with the house of Tokugawawhose orders had to be followed, in practice, the daimyoˉ gave
preference to the economic interests of their domains rather than displaying loyalty to
the bakufu, even after the bakufu’s intervention. The fact that the daimyoˉ could do so
repeatedly without serious consequences confirms Jansen (2000, p. 59) view the
bakufu-han relationship was more symbiotic than hierarchical and antagonistic. In
theory, the daimyoˉ held their domains in trust and not as private possessions, and
domains could be revoked for infractions of shogunal edicts. Over time, however,
reassignments and confiscations of daimyoˉ lands diminished, tenure became more
secure and the bakufu-han relationship became more symbiotic because both parties
shared an interest in keeping the countryside under control (Jansen, 2000, p. 54). The
bakufu provided the domains with guarantees against disruption from below.When the
number of rebellions grew in the 18th century, the bakufu frequently ordered
neighboring domains to help suppress the insurrections. Village headmen and village
officials, who were peasants and had the largest stake in local trade and industry, were
the leaders of uprisings and petition movements directed against monopolies. The
bakufu also assisted the domains during emergency food shortages resulting from bad
crops. In addition, the bakufu frequently outsourced the administration and taxation
rights of shogunal lands scattered throughout the country to han whose location made
it easy to supervise the land (Jansen, 2000, p. 43). Thus, Japan was far from being
administered in the ideal way envisaged by the Confucians of the Sorai school, namely,
a strictly hierarchical government that was based on the sanctity of filial and loyal
relationships between the ruler and the vassal (Paramore, 2012, p. 32). However, as Lidin
(1999, p. 15) writes, it was exactly such ideal Neo-Confucianist system and society,
although it never existed, to which all “later Confucian social utopianism” referred.
The first time such an imagined past of Neo-Confucianist tradition was invoked on a
large scale was in Meiji Japan. Via the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890
Neo-Confucianist values were restated and elevated to a fundamental element of
compulsory public education and were used to buttress a powerful modern state with a
nationalistic ideology (Ornatowski, 1996, p. 575). The Imperial Rescript on Education
not only made schooling mandatory and universal but also required schooling to
inculcate Neo-Confucianist values, especially loyalty to the emperor (Ham, 2004).
Neo-Confucianist values were also invoked in the economic sphere. On the eve ofWorld
War I (1914-1918), the Japanese government and the business and intellectual elite had
accepted the idea that the basic virtues of management in Japan were a paternalistic
leadership style and “warm master-servant relations” based on a unique
Neo-Confucianist tradition, on the one hand, and the capacity to ensure a harmonious
social order rather than the individual pursuit of profits, on the other hand (Gordon,
1998, p. 23). The pursuit of wealth was only legitimized if its ultimate aim was public
benefit, i.e. the nation. This concept resembles the Christian tradition and its disdain for
the pursuit of secular self-interest before the spirit of capitalism emerged and the pursuit
of self-interest became socially legitimized in the 18th century (Gerde et al., 2007).
Such agreement, however, was not easily reached. It was preceded by a debate about
worker protection that began in 1896 among bureaucrats, politicians and business
leaders. For the bureaucrats, factory legislation was necessary because excessive rates
of turnover would be inimical not only to the interests of the enterprises but also to the
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economic progress of Japan as a whole. They claimed that turnover rates were high
because business leaders were only motivated by profits and did not consider the
well-being of their employees.Working conditionswere poor, wageswere low andmany
factory workers returned to the countryside sick and disabled (Taira, 1962, p. 154). The
business leaders, in contrast, argued that by honoring the ancient “beautiful customs” of
obedience and loyalty from below and sympathetic understanding from above,
problems such as resistance to factory discipline, low morale, absenteeism, sabotage,
strikes and desertions that characterized the large majority of factory workers could be
solved. Legislation would undermine the emotional basis of the old, integrated social
order by legally sanctioning the interests of the workers (Gordon, 1998, p. 21). Whereas
Ornatowski (1996, p. 572) argues that “certain Confucian-derived values […] were […]
utilized instrumentally by Japanese industrialists and government bureaucrats […] as
theywere reflective of these elites’ own personal values”, Gordon (1998, p. 19) states that
to the business elite, invoking a Neo-Confucianist tradition was merely rhetorical. It
ultimately served their profit-oriented ends because they feared that labor legislation
would ban night work for female labor and child labor, thereby restricting factories’
operations by cutting-off a critical source of workers and leading to higher costs[4].
Thus, an invoked Neo-Confucianist tradition in which they placed their self-interest
served as moral cover for their actions, or in this case, their inactions[5]. The latter
interpretation is supported by none other than Shibusawa Eiichi, one of the most
important industrialists of theMeiji andTaishoˉ eras (1912-1926) and an ardent advocate
of the application of Neo-Confucianist values to the economic sphere (Ornatowski, 1998,
p. 354). For Japan to prosper economically, it was necessary to “reshape the character of
Japanese businessmen away from the obsequious and cunning Tokugawa merchant
toward a public-minded and well-educated modern businessman” (Ornatowski, 1998,
p. 356) who subordinated private interests to the welfare of the nation.
The debate between bureaucrats, politicians and business leaders never led to a
consensus on what particular practices would actually define these “warm
master-servant relations” (Gordon, 1998, p. 23). The parties eventually agreed on a
Factory Law that was passed in 1911, with a diluted version of this law taking effect in
1916 (Gordon, 1998), stipulating a minimum set of standards for employment
(Yamamura, 1997). In the 20 years after the Factory Law was passed, the idea that a
native Neo-Confucianist tradition was relevant to industrial relations largely
disappeared from public discussion before it eventually reemerged in 1931 (Gordon,
1998, p. 26).
6. A tentative explanation for poor labor relations in Meiji Japan
Chapter 5 leaves us with two important questions. First, what, if not Neo-Confucianism,
shaped the cultural underpinnings of the samurai class in Tokugawa Japan? Second,
how can the poor labor relations in Meiji Japan be explained?
The first question is not easy to answer. A variety of religious movements and
intellectual currents have been linked to the shaping of the samurai’s world view. To
scrutinize them all would be beyond the scope of this article. What is more, evidence for
the importance of these influences is less clear than one might assume[6]. In light of the
vast literature on the influence of religion on economic behavior in the western
hemisphere (Weber, 1958/1920; Gerde et al., 2007; Tackney, 2009; Jacobs, 2010: Rost
et al., 2010; Dyck et al., 2012), one potential source of influence on the samuraiworld view
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that deserves closer attention is religion, in particular Buddhism. Like Confucianism,
Buddhism also originated outside of Japan (Kawaguchi, 2010, p. 54). Buddhism,
however, was more influential and became the state religion in the 6th century. It
evolved from court Buddhism to a religion that influenced all layers of society. Buddhist
doctrines of karma, rebirth and the denial of the reality of corporeal existence became a
basic worldview throughout Japan (Jansen, 2000, p. 216). What is more, Buddhism was
more intimately related to the Tokugawa power structure than Neo-Confucianism was.
Daimyoˉ patronage of Buddhist temples was common, but not necessarily out of faith.
Samurai-Buddhist relations were influenced by long-standing undercurrents of tension
and mistrust and samurai applied extensive regulations to Buddhist temple
communities with doctrines and policies denying shogunal and daimyoˉ authority.
Nevertheless, the daimyoˉ continued to use Buddhist services, such as ancestor
veneration through Buddhist auspices, and to patronize temples as ameans of asserting
the legitimacy of their houses by situating their house within a larger system of social
practice (Vesey, 2004).
Buddhism, specifically various Buddhist movements and schools, also provided
spiritual and practical guidance with regard to economic life and are therefore of vital
interest for our second question, the issue of labor relations. From medieval Japanese
Buddhism, for example, an ethic of self-discipline and ascetic restraint on consumption
originated. The Nichiren movement, a school of Japanese Buddhism named after its
founder, Nichiren (1222-1282), emphasized asceticism and discipline and was the main
urban religion among townspeople in medieval Japan (Collins, 1997). The samurai
preferred Zen Buddhism. In Zen Buddhism, work is regarded as an opportunity for
meditative practice, and Zen stresses reliability and diligence in performing one’s
occupation according to one’s social status. Through divisions of labor, people are
interdependent and benefit from each other as long as their occupations are useful to
society and economic gains are not made for their own sake (Kawaguchi, 2010).
Although Zen Buddhism in general and the samurai and Zen monk Suzuki Shoˉsan
(1579-1655) specifically are often referenced by scholars seeking sources of the Japanese
work ethic (Hull and Bold, 2013), they add little to our understanding of poor labor
relations in early Meiji Japan. Nevertheless, Buddhism is, as we will elucidate, central to
understand industrial relations in Meiji Japan. In the following section, we propose a
novel, albeit preliminary explanation for this question.
6.1 Explaining poor labor relations in Meiji Japan
Whereas Buddhist teachings sought to influence people’s perceptions of work andwork
ethics in a normative way by stressing the meditative character of work as well as the
importance of diligence and discipline, Buddhist religious organizations affected the
Tokugawa economy in a very tangible and concrete way. As Collins (1997) writes, Oda
Nobunaga (1534-1582) and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1598), both preeminent daimyoˉ of
the Sengoku era (1477-1573), transferred a capitalist dynamic that had been developed
by Buddhist religious organizations to the secular economy by conducting a policy of
monastic property confiscation. In medieval Japan, Buddhist organizations had
constituted the leading sector of economic growth. These organizations were diverse,
and not all of them contributed equally to economic growth in the Middle Ages.
However, all branches of Buddhism eventually became commercialized, and by the
Sengoku era, they had all become part of the productive religious economy (Collins,
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1997, p. 853). Buddhist temples were entrepreneurial organizations in Japan that, for the
first time, combined labor, capital and land with the goal of enhancing production.
Collins (1997) infers that the monasteries’ prosperity and their methods established a
lead that was followed by the daimyoˉ during the Sengoku era. Rather than being a mere
extractor of feudal rents, the daimyoˉ adopted rational practices of land reclamation,
water control and double cropping, leading to a substantial increase in agricultural
output between 1550 and 1650. Thus, Buddhist capitalism catalyzed secular capitalism,
and in Tokugawa Japan, secular market capitalism outgrew religious capitalism.
Wage labor became a central element of this secular market capitalism. Whereas in
the 16th century, conscripted peasants, artisans and hereditary domestic servants in
samurai householdsmade up the traditional labor force in non-agricultural occupations,
in the 17th century, a major transformation of work and working relations took place
that gathered momentum after 1650 (Mathias, 2011). Wage labor emerged, and by 1700,
one-fifth to one-third of the population in the cities and towns consisted of hired
servants, shop hands and manual laborers (Leupp, 1992, p. 176). The shift from corvée
labor to wage labor was brought about by the enormous demand for labor due to the
simultaneous realization of large infrastructure projects. This made the Tokugawa
shogunate realize that this labor demand could not be met by corvée labor alone without
endangering agricultural production and, hence, tax income (Leupp, 1992; Mathias,
2011).
Urban growth also drove the expansion of an urban working class. These workers
were employed by the shogunate, its officials, the daimyoˉ, and merchant and artisan
households (Leupp, 1992; Mathias, 2011). The urban workers were farmers who had
flocked to the cities in the search for away tomake a living.According to Rozman (1974),
Edo grew by 10,000 immigrants a year during the first half of the 17th century and by
approximately 15,000 in the second half of the 17th century.
Not surprisingly, according to the ruling class, the peasant migrants were lazy, had a
selfish desire to better their lot, shirked their appointed tasks (i.e. producing rice for the
ruling class) and were merely “looking for a free ride” (Leupp, 1992, p. 66). Neither the
wage laborers’ work ethic nor the quality of master-servant relations matched the ideal
as, for example, celebrated in popular fiction or normative contemporary writings
(Leupp, 1992, pp. 70ff.). Takemura (1997, p. 194) notes that “Ninomiya [Sontoku, see
above; the author]’s thought does not represent the idea of work prevalent in the
advanced areas […]”. Similarly, casual, short-term employment in the trading houses of
Edo differed substantially from Ishida Baigan’s ideas. As commerce expanded during
the 18th century, so did the hiring of short-time labor for unskilled or semi-skilled tasks
(Mathias, 2011). An increasing number of workers did not remain in their positions long
enough to develop the idealized sentimental bonds with their employers. In favor of the
urban workers was the fact that in Tokugawa Japan, there was a consistently high
demand for wage labor, and nearly anyone could find employment, regardless of their
attitude and quality of work (Leupp, 1992). Crimes committed by paid workers were
seen as a direct consequence of the loosening bond between master and servant.
Running away was the most common crime. Other crimes included workers’ violence,
fighting or theft. Mutual suspicion and hostility were in evidence, including masters
physically abusing employees they deemed lazy. The fact that each worker legally
required a guarantor ensuring that the worker adhered to the employment contract
indicates that labor relations were far from the ideal depicted in Zen Buddhism,
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Neo-Confucianism or the other schools introduced above. Guarantors were held liable
for the repayment of wages in case the worker absconded. In many cases, a single
employee had several guarantors, all of whomwere held liable if theworker did notmeet
his contractual obligations (Leupp, 1992; Mathias, 2011). Whether this was the outcome
of the workers’ work ethic or merely a reaction to employment conditions is an open
question. In any case, the perception of these urban workers in Tokugawa Japan, who
latermade up one group of the industrial labor force in theMeiji era, was hardly positive.
The second group making up the industrial labor force in Meiji Japan was farmers
newlymigrating to the cities. In Tokugawa Japan, the attitude of the ruling class toward
farmers was by no means more favorable than the attitude toward the urban working
class, as contemporary writings reveal. These writings either reflect the very mundane
desire of the ruling class to secure their income or the writer’s ideological support of the
class system, the shinoˉkoˉshoˉ or both. Theories on theway to rule farmers were proposed
by, for example, Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691), a Neo-Confucian scholar, and Honda
Masanobu (1538-1616), a samurai himself. His book Honsaroku (“The Record of Honda
Masanobu”), whichwas oriented toward the ruling class, stated that the farmersmust be
ruled wisely because they were the source of income for the samurai class. Farmers
should be controlled by allowing them to possess just enough to live upon, not more or
less. Kumazawa Banzan expressed similar sentiments and recommended keeping
farmers diligent and safe from starvation to ensure rich harvests. Farmers should have
neither too much nor too little for their living. Furthermore, in Kumazawa’s view, the
individual farmer was ignorant and should be pitied. Thus, in a nutshell, “the keynote of
the agricultural policy followed by the Tokugawa Shogunate was ‘to keep farmers alive
but not allow them to live in comfort’” (Honjo, 1939, p. 8). The finance superintendent of
the 1730s put it more bluntly. Comparing farmers to sesame seeds, he asserted that “the
more you squeeze, the more you obtain from them” (Leupp, 1992, p. 7). Adding to the
inferior position of the farmers was the fact that samurai were subject to codes of
behavior onlywithin their own status group. Themajority of law in the daimyoˉ domains
consisted of house precepts that regulated the behavior of thewarrior-retainers. No laws
regulated the samurai’s relations with the lower social orders. The samurai were legally
free to act violently toward the lower social classes, especially in punishing affronts in
matters of personal deference because they had no rights under samurai law (Collins,
1997, p. 857).
Thus, these two groups, the urban wage laborers already residing in the cities and
farmers from Japan’s hinterland who were newly migrating to the cities, constituted the
factory workers in Meiji Japan. Although the Meiji Restoration in 1868 represented a
major cesura in political terms with imperial rule restored, work and labor market
conditions in the early Meiji era resembled those during the Tokugawa era, as Leupp
(1992) has noted. Employers found it difficult to recruit enough workers despite the
labor reserve from Japan’s hinterland, and they complained, as their counterparts in
Tokugawa Japan did, about high labor turnover, employee laziness, a lack of loyalty,
absenteeism, and desertions (Taira, 1962). In a nationwide survey on the working and
living conditions of factory workers published in 1903 by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Commerce, factorymanagers complained that workers did not distinguish between
working and resting time, did not always fully concentrate on their work and attempted
to evade supervision to rest, chat with fellow workers or smoke; therefore, factory
managers had no other choice than to increase working hours. The Ministry conceded
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that work discipline was lower in Japan than in Europe, but it took into consideration
that the long working hours and dire working conditions led to the Japanese workers’
lax work discipline (Hashimoto, 2002). Taira (1962) also states that workers had to cope
with long working hours and poor working conditions. He explains the dire working
conditions by the fact that employers had to contract labor recruiters to tap the labor
reserve in the hinterland, leading to soaring recruiting costs that the employers
attempted to offset by cutting wages and reducing non-wage expenses that directly
affected the welfare of workers, such as housing, eating and recreational facilities,
lengthening workdays or speeding processes to exact as much effort from the workers
as possible.
The ideas of economic liberalism that were imported reinforced the prevalent
attitudes about labor relations and legitimated the poor working conditions, fending off
government intervention to regulate the labor and improve workers’ conditions[7]. The
concept of economic liberalismwasmade available by translations aswell as by original
Japanese writings. The first to introduce economic liberalism was Kanda Koˉhei
(1828-1898). Kanda had learned Confucianism in his youth, but after Perry’s visit to
Japan he became an ardent student of Rangaku (“Dutch Studies”)[8]. In 1862, the bakufu
made Kanda an instructor at theBansho Shirabesho (“Institute for the Study ofWestern
Books”) (Horie, 1962). He published two books before theRestoration: theNoˉshoˉben (“On
Agriculture and Trade”) in 1861 and theKeizai Shoˉgaku (“An Economic Handbook”) in
1867/1868. In linewith classical economics, he declared thatmen are, by nature, different
from each other; some are lazy, whereas others are industrious. This explains why some
grow rich while others remain or become poor. Government intervention would
discourage virtue and eventually impoverish the nation (Sugiyama, 1968). Other
conspicuous proponents of economic liberalism were Tsuda Masamichi (1829-1903), a
law expert and one of the members involved in the drafting of the Meiji constitution
(Kiyota, 1966); Taguchi Ukichi (1855-1905), a historian and economist, occasionally
referred to as “the Japanese Adam Smith”; Amano Tameyuki (1861-1938), a Japanese
politician, educator and economist; and Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), one of the
best-known, most widely studied and most frequently quoted writers of the early Meiji
period and the alleged “champion of the ‘Japanese enlightenment’” (Sugiyama, 1968,
p. 327). Like Kanda, Fukuzawa proposed the laissez-faire idea and maintained that to
achieve national wealth, the government must not put restrictions on people’s activities.
What set him apart from the 19th century Anglo-American liberalism, however, was
Fukuzawa’s explicit contempt for manual labor. Only work that required the use of the
heart (i.e. the head) was to be honored in society. Fukuzawa further held the opinion that
the source of everything good and edifying in Japan was the former samurai thanks to
their family background and tradition. With a few exceptions, he regarded commoners
as foolish, spiritless and powerless. Although he failed to criticize class relations during
Tokugawa Japan, Fukuzawa’s ideas resonated with themost conservative, not the most
liberal 19th century Anglo-American thought (Kinmonth, 1978).
It was only toward the end ofMeiji Japan that labor relations started to improve. First
of all, the necessity of regulating the labor market attracted governmental attention in
the late 19th century (Oda, 1999). However, it was not the workers’ well-being that was
the main concern. The agreement about the revision of the unequal treaties between
Japan and the countries concerned in 1894 together with Japan’s victory over China in
the Sino-Japanese war in 1985 provided a significant impetus for Japan’s
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industrialization (Sugiyama, 1968), and the subsequent rapid modernization and
industrialization gave rise to a number of social problems (Nishizawa, 2012). The Meiji
government promoted a developmental state policy following the Prussian way, and as
early as 1882, it began studyingWestern examples of factory legislations, as it had done
for other legal eras (Tackney, 2009). The government did so, however, less out of concern
for the welfare of workers than out of a desire to improve industrial productivity.
Needless to say, the liberalists categorically opposed any such law, and before 1900,
Japanese bureaucrats lacked the insulation from business interests necessary to
champion protectionist labor policies (Garon, 1987, p.18-19).
The need to improve workers’ conditions for the further development of the national
economy was also recognized by a group of scholars who formed the Shakai Seisaku
Gakkai (“Japan’s Society for the Study of Social Policy”) in 1896. The Society was
modeled after its German example, the Society for the Study of Social Problems, founded
in 1872. Its goal was to promote studies that facilitated the state’s active role in
regulating work and industrial relations with the objective of helping the nation to
develop and modernize as quickly as possible (Mouer and Kawanishi, 2005, p. 28). The
ideas of the Society for the Study of Social Problems were introduced to Japan by
Wadagaki Kenzoˉ (1860-1919). Wadagaki taught economics and economic history at the
LawCollege of the (Tokyo) Imperial University, the center for the dissemination of ideas
from Germany in Japan (Nishizawa, 2012). In 1888, he published an article in which he
refused both economic liberalism and socialism and instead argued for a third way that
maintained an order based on private ownership and achieved social harmony through
the action of individuals and the power of the state (Sugiyama, 1968; Nishizawa, 2012).
In 1892-1893, Kanai Noboru, also a professor of economics at the Law College of the
(Tokyo) Imperial University from 1890, wrote an article called “Genkon no Shakaiteki
Mondai” (“The Present Social Questions”). These two articles were regarded “as events
that ‘tolled the funeral bell of liberal economics and the daybreak bell of the newGerman
economic thought’ […] ” (Nishizawa, 2012, p. 310).
The bureaucrats’ attempts to ameliorate working conditions borne out of their
concern for the nation’s competitiveness and the dissemination of the new German
economic thought were not the only influences that led to discussions about factory law
and, eventually to improvements in working conditions. Another important factor was
the chronic labor shortage, a by-product of Japan’s rapid industrialization. For example,
in the textile industry, the first industry in Japan to adopt extensive factory production,
the local supplies of labor to textilemills were exhausted by 1890. Textile producersfirst
responded with increased recruiting efforts (see above) but around 1910, they realized
that it was more efficient for them to improve working conditions and to motivate
workers and encourage them to stay longer rather than using coercivemeasures to force
production up while incurring high expenses for supervision and recruiting (Taira,
1962).
Around the same time, the scientific management movement, also known as
Taylorism, began to spread in Japan. Although certain prerequisites for the successful
implementation of the movement first had to be put into place, as Hashimoto (2002) has
shown, over time, Taylorism exerted a strong influence on the Japanese production
system and had a lasting influence on Japanese management (Hashimoto, 2002;
Vaszkun and Tsutsui, 2012). Some Japanese intellectuals criticized Taylorism for its
alleged tendencies to deskill labor, increase individualism and emphasize production
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output at the expense of labor (Vaszkun and Tsutsui, 2012). Nevertheless, its adoption,
adaptation and further development had a lasting and positive effect on the employer –
employee relationship. Tsutsui (1998) even argues that understanding the Taylorist
heritage is essential for understanding the post-war “Japanese-style management”.
The list of potential influences on labor relations inMeiji Japan does not end here. To
cover them all in detail and to assess their impact would go beyond the scope of this
article. Crucial for our understanding is that neither labor relations in Meiji Japan nor
Japan’s famed post-war labor-management relations were simply a continuation of a
centuries-old cultural tradition, but rather the product of a multitude of factors, both
indigenous and imported from abroad.
7. Conclusion and implications for further research
This article set out to explain the poor nature of industrial relations in Meiji Japan
(1868-1911). In this section, we review the main findings and discuss directions for
future research.
It has frequently been claimed that to understand the workings of the present-day
Japanese economy in general and labor relations in particular, it is essential to
understand Japan’s centuries-old Neo-Confucianist heritage, whose valueswere broadly
institutionalized within Japanese society during the Tokugawa era (1603-1867).
Although research indicates the existence of such values in post-war Japan, their
apparent absence in labor relations during Meiji Japan (1868-1911) is puzzling. Their
lack has been explained by a temporary decline of Neo-Confucianism duringMeiji Japan
due to its close relationship to the ideology of the Tokugawa regime and the strong
Westernizing tendencies of early Meiji era policies and thought. Others have attributed
the absence to the fact that only the samurai elite, not the former commoners, espoused
Neo-Confucianist values. Because both former samurai and many former commoners
established new businesses, Neo-Confucianist values first had to enter labor-
management relations. We argue that so little of the Neo-Confucianist heritage is
detectable inMeiji labor relations because it wasn’t institutionalized inTokugawa Japan
in the first place.
Against this background, our key findings can be summarized as follows. Contrary
to widespread belief, Neo-Confucianist values were not broadly anchored within
Tokugawa society. Neo-Confucianism was not adopted as the state ideology from the
beginning of the Tokugawa era, and later efforts to institutionalize its values were
confined to the samurai class due to inadequate means and channels of reaching all
layers of Tokugawa society. Moreover, there is evidence that Neo-Confucianist values
were less anchored among the samurai class than generally assumed. Even the elite of
the samurai class systematically neglected Neo-Confucianist duties, ignored hierarchies
and regulations and disregarded loyalties.
In Meiji Japan, however, an imagined past of Neo-Confucianist tradition served as a
plane for moral projections. Neo-Confucianist values were elevated to a fundamental
element of compulsory public education and were used to buttress a powerful modern
state with a nationalistic ideology. By the late Meiji era, such an imagined past had also
entered the economic sphere and the discussions of factory regulations. At that time,
however, it was still a rhetorical device with little substance. Labor relations, especially
in early Meiji Japan, resembled closely those prevalent during Tokugawa Japan, when
wage labor had expanded rapidly within a capitalist market economy. The introduction
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of Western liberal economics in late Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan thought did not
compete with a Neo-Confucianist heritage but rather reinforced the prevailing attitude
about labor relations. Thus, Neo-Confucianism contributed much less to the cultural
underpinnings of Japanese society in Tokugawa and Meiji Japan than commonly
assumed. This conclusion leads to a number of implications for further research.
First, more effort is needed to increase our knowledge of prewar labor relations,
especially late Tokugawa/early Meiji Japan, through original research as well as the
reception of Japanese literature on this topic. This attempt will not only close the
existing gap in Western research on Japan but will also enhance our understanding of
how Japanese labor relations developed. For example, did labor relations in samurai
households differ from those in merchant or peasant households? Did labor relations
differ in towns and in the countryside, where wage labor also spread with the
development of proto-industrialism?
Second, with regard to our understanding of Tokugawa Japan, the cultural
underpinnings of the samurai class appear less straightforward than generally
assumed. As we have shown, widely accepted assumptions about the importance and
the influence of religious movements and intellectual currents must be further
scrutinized to enhance our understanding of Tokugawa Japan. Assuming that values
frame a person’s actions, further research on the actual economic behavior in Tokugawa
Japan is necessary. This research will complement and/or contrast with contemporary
writings on normative ethics and will facilitate inferences about the cultural
underpinnings of the samurai and commoners. Such research will also enhance our
understanding of what enabled the spread of secular market capitalism inmedieval and
Tokugawa Japan. Did factors such as religion or intellectual currents have a supportive
or inhibitive effect? With reference to Gerde et al. (2007), how and why did economic
self-pursuit gain legitimacy among the samurai?Was an explicit or implicit moral cover
used by the daimyoˉ to justify economic self-pursuit?
Third, with regard to our understanding of post-war Japan and the Japanese
economy, although we have fairly good knowledge of when, by whom and to what end
Japan’s ancient Neo-Confucianist traditions were invoked or rejected, the question
remains of when these values were institutionalized to such a degree that they served as
a motive for economic behavior. This question is of crucial importance because the
notion of a centuries-old Neo-Confucianist heritage influencing economic behavior in
Japan is widespread and forms the basis of many economic and business studies that
have substantially shaped our view of the Japanese economy and Japan’s firms and
economic actors.
Fourth, in view of these conclusions, the question arises about the role of invented
traditions in the development and dissemination of management theories in Japan as
well as in other countries or cultural areas. How have invented traditions helped develop
and legitimize certain management practices? What role have they played in a “fad”
becoming a “paradigm” and, hence, an element in internally recognized management
theory, as discussed by Towill (2006)?What elements need to be in place for an invented
tradition to become accepted? Who propagates these invented traditions? We are
confident that studying the history of management practices from the perspective of
invented traditions will yield many more unexpected results.
Finally, more research is needed on the interaction between culture, economic
behavior and institutions, in general. How does culture emerge? What determines the
JMH
20,4
402
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y U
ZH
 H
au
ptb
ibl
iot
he
k /
 Z
en
tra
lbi
bli
oth
ek
 Z
üri
ch
 A
t 0
5:5
5 2
0 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 (
PT
)
persistence of cultural traits? Under what circumstances do cultural traits influence
behavior and institutions?Why, for example, did Neo-Confucianism allegedly matter in
post-war labor relations in Japan and Korea (Seong, 2003; Kim et al., 2004; Kim, 2009),
but not in China, another country with a so-called “Neo-Confucianist tradition” (Shen,
2008)? In tackling such questions, rigorous testing is essential (see for example Gong
et al., 2013 and their empirical study of the effects of Chinese guanxi in strategic
alliances) to prevent cultural explanations from being mere attempts to “claim the
residuals” or ex-post rationalizations.
Notes
1. Culture is defined as “customary beliefs, values, and social constraints that ethic, religious,
and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (Guiso et al.,
2006).
2. The term “invented tradition” refers to a set of practices seeking to inculcate certain values
and norms of behavior by repetition in an attempt to establish continuity with a suitable
historic past. See Hobsbawm (2012).
3. For the limitations and strengths of a case study approach, see Hayek et al. (2010).
4. This controversy on why the Japanese business elite invoked Neo-Confucianist tradition
recalls on a similar discussion in literature regarding whether Southern paternalistic
leadership style in the United States during antebellum slavery was benevolent or solely
serving. See Hayek et al. (2010).
5. See Gerde et al. (2007) on religion as moral cover for the pursuit of economic self-interest.
6. Such is the case with Neo-Confucianism, as we have just seen, and such is also the case with,
for example, thewell-knownBushidoˉ (“TheWay of theWarrior”). Bushidoˉ is widely regarded
as the centuries-old code of behavior of the samurai class that was transmitted into modern
Japan and became a fundamental concept of Japanese militarism before 1945 (Benesh, 2011).
Bushidoˉ, however, was largely unknown in Japan before the last decade of the 19th century.
Modern Bushidoˉ discourse began in the 1880s and reflected Japan’s attempts to redefine itself
with regard to the “foreign” (i.e. the West). Dissemination on a large scale began only after
1900, especially after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 (Nakamura, 2008). Within this
context, Hagakure (“hidden by the leaves”), written in the early 19th century, became one of
the most significant samurai texts only after its publication in the early 20th century
(Nakamura, 2008; Benesh, 2011). Besides Confucianism, Buddhism and Shintoism are usually
cited as major religions in Tokugawa Japan. Shintoism or Shintoˉ (l“Way of the Gods”) is
regarded as a native religion of Japan. It is characterized by a set of indigenous practices, the
veneration of nature spirits and ancestors, and a lack of formal dogma. It was first referred to
in the 8th century, but despite these early roots Shintoˉ cannot be treated as an independent
religion due to its syncretic nature and its overlapswith Buddhism andConfucianism (Jansen,
2000, p. 217). For example, one school of thought maintained that the supreme goddess of
Shintoismwas a rebornBuddha, and another school of thought reversed this order (Oda, 1999,
p. 26). What is more, it was only in late Tokugawa that many of these elements became
structured into something called Shintoˉ. Emerging from the umbrella of Buddhism, it was
closely intermingled with folk religion and pieced together ancestor worship, portents, and
direction. The beginning of Shintoˉ as a state-related religion was marked by a governmental
decree in 1868, which ordered the “separation of the gods and Buddhas” and was
accompanied by outbursts of violence against Buddhist institutions (Antoni, 1995).
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7. After Japan was opened up by Commodore Matthew Perry (1794-1858), who had landed at
Edo bay in 1853, Japan imported not onlyWestern technology and products on an increasing
scale but also Western ideas. In the field of economic thought, the liberal school of British
origin was the dominant idea in the earlier years of Meiji Japan (Sugiyama, 1968).
8. Rangaku had emerged in the 17th century as a consequence of the policy of national seclusion
followed by the early Tokugawa shogunate. From 1639 to the 1850s, employees of the Dutch
East India Company were the only Westerners allowed to enter Japan (Van Sant, 2012).
Through Rangaku or Yoˉgaku (“Western learning”), Western technology and methods were
introduced to Japan. An official translation bureau commissioned by the bakufu and similar
enterprises undertaken by various daimyoˉworked on the translation and collection of Dutch
works on subjects such as medicine, chemistry, shipbuilding, mechanics, mining,
mathematics, physics and pyrotechnics. Efforts to study the West were intensified after
Commodore Perry landed in Edo Bay in 1853 (Smith, 1948).
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